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I.
Appellants
Committee

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Merrill

Cook

and

Merrill

Cook

for

Congress

(hereinafter "Cook") appeal from the final Judgment of

the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable
Sandra N. Peuler presiding, entered December 20, 2000 in favor of
Appellee R.T. Nielson Co. (hereinafter "RTNC" or "Appellee").

This

Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2 (3) (j) (2000) .
II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

ISSUE NO. 1:

Did the trial court err in entering judgment on

a special verdict of the jury finding an oral modification of an
agreement that by its terms could not be orally modified when such
oral modification is not a recognizable cause of action under Utah
law?
This issue was preserved below.
R2232-2242, 2450-2460];

E.g., [R73]1; [R2028-2040,

Trial Transcript, Day 1, pp. 83-84.

This issue is a question of law for which no deference is
given to the determination of the trial court. E.g. , Provo City v.
Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979); State v. Haston.
846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).
ISSUE NO. 2 : Did the trial court err in awarding $195,800.93
in attorney's fees to RTNC under a clause of the written agreement
providing recovery of fees for "litigation brought to enforce any
provision of this agreement" when only Cook prevailed on any claims
1

All citations are to the record as indexed by the Clerk
of the Third Judicial District Co^rt pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

under the written agreement and there was no evidence of any other
agreement regarding attorney's fees?
The issue was preserved below.

E.g., [R2028-2040, 2232-2242,

2450-2460]
This issue is an interpretation of the contract of the parties
and is therefore a question of law to which this Court gives no
deference to the ruling of the trial court.

E.g., Provo City v.

Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979).
ISSUE NO. 3:

Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee

RTNC $195,800.93 for attorney's fees when there was no finding and
no

evidences

that

those

fees

were

incurred,

owed

or

the

responsibility of RTNC?
This issue was preserved below. E.g., [R2028-2040, 2232-2242,
2450-2060]
This issue of whether it was proper to award attorneys fees
claimed by RTNC without evidence they were incurred, owed or the
responsibility of RTNC is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness.

Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc 1 s, 910 P. 2d

E.g.,

1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828
P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992)).
ISSUE NO. 4:
RTNC

$195,800.93

Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee
for

attorney's

fees

under

the

following

circumstances:
a)

When there were no contemporaneous or other documents
itemizing the attorney's work or its reasonableness or
necessity?
2

b)

When there were no contemporaneous or other documents
from which the trial court could segregate the claimed
fees between compensable versus non-compensable claims?

Each of these issues were preserved below.

E.g.,

[R2028-2040,

2232-2242, 2450-2460]
This

issue

of

the

whether

the

amount

of

the

award

of

attorney's fees was proper is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.

Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc*s, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257

(Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE NO. 5:
Cook

his

Did the trial court err in refusing to award

attorney's

fees

resulting

from RTNC f s

breach of

the

parties' written agreement?
This issue was preserved below.

E.g., [R2028-2040]

Whether attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
v.

J.J.

Johnson

& Assoc's,

910. P. 2d

1252,

E.g.,

1257

Selvage

(Utah

App.

1996) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah
App.

1992)).
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS

There

are

no

determinative

constitutional

or

statutory

provisions.
IV.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW.

Appellee RTNC brought this action against Cook asserting the
following claims:

three

(3) separate claims for breach of oral

contract, two (2) separate claims for breach of written contract
3

(i.e., the "Services Agreement"), a claim for account stated, and
a claim for quantum meruit.

[Rl-12]

Cook answered the Complaint

and asserted counter claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and
for an award of attorney's fees.

[R66-97]

The claims proceeded to trial before the Third District Court,
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding.

The matter was tried to a

jury during the period of April 3 through April 14, 2000.

At

trial, only the following claims were submitted to the jury:
1)

RTNC's claim that the parties' written agreement was
orally modified and that Cook breached the orally
modified agreement;

2)

RTNC's claim
cycle;

3)

RTNC's claim for quantum meruit during the post-election
phase;

4)

Cook's claim for breach of contract; and

5)

Cook's claim for breach of fiduciary duty. [R1941-1947]

for quantum meruit

during

the

election

By special verdict, the jury found that the parties had modified
their written Services Agreement and that Cook had breached this
modified contract by failing to pay to RTNC the amount of $182,483.
[R1941-1942]

The jury further found that RTNC was entitled to

recover $11,509 under its unjust enrichment claim for services
provided during the post-election cycle.

[R1943]

Finally, the

jury found that RTNC had breached the parties' written Services
Agreement and awarded Cook $19,521 as a result of that breach.
[R1946]

This was the only finding by the jury that the written

Services Agreement had been breached.

4

Thereafter on April 24, 2000, Cook moved for an award of its
attorney's fees pursuant to the written Services Agreement which
provided the recovery of fees for "litigation brought to enforce
any provision

of

this agreement", and pursuant

to the

finding that RTNC had breached that written agreement.
2040]

jury's
[R2032-

RTNC also moved for an award of its attorney's fees even

though there was no finding that Cook breached the terms of the
written Services Agreement.

On May 15, 2000 the trial court denied

Cook's Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees and indicated that
RTNC was the "only party who may be entitled to an award of fees
and costs in this matter."

[R2191-2193]

RTNC filed an Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs which
failed to include any evidence that the claimed fees were incurred
by or an obligation of RTNC, or supporting documentation (such as
contemporaneous billing entries or records).
objected

to

the Affidavit

and the trial

[R2071-2077]

court

objection by noting that RTNC's counsel: 1)

sustained

Cook
that

failed to itemize

specific work performed and the time spent in each aspect of the
work by each individual; and 2)

failed to segregate fees incurred

on compensable versus non-compensable claims.
trial court
substantiate

then gave counsel
its

claims

[R2356-2360]

The

for RTNC another opportunity to

for attorney's

fees.

A

Supplemental

Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs was filed, again without any
evidence that any fees had actually been incurred and without any
contemporaneous

supporting

documentation.

[2381-2408]

Supplemental Affidavit was again objected to by Cook.
5

This

The trial

court, however, awarded RTNC attorney1s fees in the amount

of

$195,800.93, even though there was no evidence that RTNC incurred
the fees claimed.

[R2481-2483]

On December 20, 2000 the trial court entered Judgment in favor
of RTNC and against Cook in the principal amount of $174,471.00 for
the breach of an orally

modified written

contract

and

enrichment claims, and $195,800.93 for attorney's fees.

unjust

Cook filed

its Notice of Appeal on January 5, 2001.
2.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS.
A.

1.

FACTS RELEVANT TO MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT ISSUE.

In early 1996, Merrill Cook was a candidate

for the

United States House of Representatives for the Second Congressional
District of Utah.

[R2 at H 6]

The Merrill Cook for Congress

Committee was a campaign committee organized and existing under the
Federal Election Act.
2.

At

all

[R2 at H 3]

relevant

times

Appellee

RTNC

was

a

Utah

corporation in the business of, inter alia, providing management,
consulting, staffing, fund raising, polling, media, research, and
advertising services for Republican political candidates.
3.
with

[R2]

On March 5, 1996 Cook entered into a written agreement

RTNC,

Agreement".

which

RTNC

drafted,

referred

to

as

the

"Services

Under the Services Agreement, RTNC would provide fund

raising, polling, advertising, and "general consulting" concerning
Mr. Cook's 1996 campaign for re-election to Congress.
17]

6

[Trial Ex.

In particular, under the Services Agreement, RTNC agreed to do
the following:
In accepting retainment by
[Cook], Nielson shall
undertake and assume the responsibility of performing for
and on behalf of [Cook] all duties and responsibilities
which are reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes of
this Agreement as set forth above.
In particular, Nielson shall oversee all general
consulting for the campaign. This shall include campaign
planning and strategy, convention management, delegate
stacking and targeting, and other duties involved with
general consulting. Nielson shall be required to oversee
and administer all PAC fund raising activities.
In
addition Nielson shall provide polling, and advertising
as required and needed by [Cook].

[Cook] further covenants and agrees that Nielson is
entitled to oversee and conduct all PAC fund raising,
consulting, polling and advertising and that Client will
not conduct any of these activities without first
consulting with Nielson and will not in any way interfere
with Nielson's efforts.
Nielson shall receive 15% of the gross amount of all PAC
monies received, regardless of the source. This agreement to
perform PAC fund raising shall extend for a period of four
months after the general election date.
(b) General Consulting. Nielson shall receive the sum of
$40,000 for consulting services through May 4, 1996. After
May 4, 19 96 and during the periods of the primary and general
elections Nielson shall receive $4,000 a month for general
consulting. . . .
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, f 2, 3 & 4.2
4.
11

In

the

Services

Agreement

the

parties

agreed

that

[a]dditional services and fees may be negotiated and agreed to at

2

Under this Agreement, Cook paid RTNC
$230,000.00, [Trial Transcript, Day 3, pp. 87-88].
7

approximately

a later date."

Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, % 4.(b).

It was

also agreed, however, that:
. . . No change or modification of this Agreement shall
be valid or binding unless it is in writing and signed bv
the party intended to be bound.
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, U 15 (emphasis added).
5.

At

trial Mr. Nielson admitted

there were no written

modifications to the Services Agreement:
Q.

Would you turn back to Exhibit 17 [the Services
Agreement] , please. Turn to the last page of Exhibit 17.
Look at paragraph 15.
Are you familiar with that paragraph?

A.

Yes, I've read through it.

Q.

Okay. Now the essence of that paragraph says that the
only modifications to this agreement that are allowed are
those that are in writing, correct?

A.

That's what it says.

Q.

Signed by the parties?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now, you didn't do that here, did you?

A.

No, we did not.

Trial Transcript, Day 2, p. 165.
The oral modification claimed by RTNC was alleged to have resulted
from certain discussions between Messrs. Nielson and Cook.

E.g.,

[Rl-12]
6.

At

the conclusion

of the trial, the

only breach of

contract claim RTNC submitted to the jury was for breach of an oral
modification of the Services Agreement.

The jury was not asked

whether Cook breached the Services Agreement or whether the parties

8

entered into any new oral agreement. The jury's Special Verdict on
RTNC's breach of contract claim was as follows:
1.
Did the RTNC and [Cook] modify
Agreement as alleged by the RTNC?
Answer:

their

Services

Yes.

2. . . . If your answer to 1. is "Yes", did Merrill Cook
and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee breach their
contract with the R.T. Nielson Co. as modified by failing
to pay the R.T. Nielson Co. as agreed and/or violating
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Answer:

Yes.

[R1941-1942]
B.

FACTS RELEVANT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ISSUES.

In addition to the foregoing facts, the following facts are
relevant to the attorney's fees issues on appeal:
7.

The written Services Agreement at paragraph 14 contained

the following provision regarding attorney's fees:
Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement shall
be awarded its costs and attorneys fees.
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, ^| 14.
8.

In contrast to RTNC's breach of contract claim based on

an oral modification to the Services Agreement, Cook's contract
claim was for breach of the provisions of the Services Agreement.
The jury's Special Verdict on Cook's breach of contract claim was
as follows:
16.
Did the RTNC breach the Services Agreement as
alleged by [Cook], including the breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing?
Answer:

Yes.

[R1946]
9

9.

Following the jury's verdict under which Cook was the

only party to prevail on a claim to enforce the Services Agreement,
Cook moved for an award of its attorney's fees pursuant to the
jury's

finding

that RTNC had breached

that written agreement.

[R2038-2040]
10.

RTNC also moved for an award of its attorney's fees even

though there was no finding that Cook breached the terms of the
written Services Agreement.
11.

On May 15, 2000 the trial court denied Cook's Motion for

an Award of Attorney's Fees and indicated that RTNC was the "only
party who may be entitled to an award of fees and costs in this
matter."
12.

[R2191-2193]
RTNC filed an Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs

seeking an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $210,290.00.
[R2071-2077]

Cook objected to RTNC's Affidavit of Attorneys Fees

on the following bases:

a)

There was no breach by Cook of the

written agreement or any covenant to which the attorney's fees
agreement attached;

b)

the claim did not include any supporting

documentation (such as contemporaneous billing entries or records)
or any detail of the work and time spent on this matter;

c) the

claim did not set forth any evidence that the claimed fees were
incurred by or were an obligation of RTNC;

and d)

not

compensable

segregate

the

compensable claims.
13.

fees

incurred

between

the claim did
and non-

[See id.; R2232-2242]

The trial court sustained Cook's objection by noting that

RTNC's counsel: 1)

failed to itemize specific work performed and
10

the time spent in each aspect of the work by each individual; and
2)

failed to segregate fees incurred on compensable versus non-

compensable claims.

[R2356-2360]

The trial court ignored Cook's

objection that there was no evidence that attorney's fees had been
incurred.3

The

trial

court

then

gave

counsel

for

RTNC

an

additional thirty (30) days and another opportunity to substantiate
its claim for attorney's fees.
14.

[R2356-2360]

On September 5, 2000 RTNC's counsel filed a Supplemental

Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs.
again

failed

to

include

any

The Supplemental Affidavit

contemporaneous

supporting

documentation or any evidence that the fees were incurred or were
the obligation of RTNC.
15.

[R2381-2408]

This Supplemental Affidavit was again objected to by

Cook4 on the following bases:

1)

There was no evidence that RTNC

incurred or were responsible for the nearly $200,000 in fees being
claimed;

2)

There was no contemporaneous billing documentation

submitted which made the determination of the reasonableness and
necessity

of the claimed fees impossible;

contemporaneous

billing documentation

3)

There was no

submitted which made the

3

To this day, and despite the issue being squarely raised
several times by Cook before the award of fees, there is no
evidence to suggest that RTNC actually incurred or was responsible
for payment of any fees. For all that we know, this lawsuit was
funded by a political opponent of Mr. Cook at a time when his
congressional seat was being targeted both from within and without
his party.
4

The Objection was filed by Cook on October 5, 2000 as
Cook had obtained from the court an enlargement of time for filing
the response after RTNC's counsel refused to agree to the
enlargement of time. [R2447-2449]
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allocation of fees between compensable and non-compensable claims
impossible;

4)

The

purported

allocation

of

fees

between

compensable and non-compensable claims was improper; and 5)

There

was no evidence from which a determination could be made that the
attorney's and non-attorney's billing rates were consistent with
the rates customarily charged in the locale for similar services.
[R2450-2460]
16.

With respect to the reasonableness and necessity of the

claimed fees, the only evidence submitted by RTNC's counsel was two
(2) nearly identical statements to the effect that all of the work
performed

"was reasonable,

proper representation of

appropriate,

and necessary

for the

[RTNC] according to the standards and

practices of similarly situated and qualified attorneys in this
area."

[R2073, 2394]

17.

Despite these deficiencies, the trial court awarded RTNC

attorney's fees in the sum of $195,800.93.

[R2481-2483]

Despite

Cook's request, the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing
or even oral argument.
18.
favor

of

[R2232-2242]

On December 20, 2000 the trial court entered Judgment in
RTNC

and

against

Cook

in

the

principal

amount

of

$174,471.00 for the breach of the orally modified contract and
unjust enrichment claims

(after offsetting award to Cook), and

$195,800.93 for attorney's fees.
on January 5, 2 001.

12

Cook filed the Notice of Appeal

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

RTNC'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF ORALLY MODIFIED AGREEMENT.

The trial court erred in entering Judgment in favor of RTNC
for its purported claim for breach of the orally modified Services
Agreement when, by its express terms, that Agreement could not be
orally modified.

Under Utah law, the parties1 Services Agreement

could only be modified in a writing signed by the party intended to
be bound.

It is undisputed that no such written modification

occurred and the court erred in not interpreting the contract and
determining, as a matter of law, that there was no modification of
the Agreement.

Moreover, given that there was no finding (and the

jury was not asked) whether the parties entered into any additional
agreement, RTNC f s sole breach of contract claim which was for
breach of the oral modification cannot stand;

therefore, the trial

court's Judgment in favor of RTNC on this claim must be reversed.
2.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC.

The trial court erred on numerous grounds in awarding to RTNC
$195,800.93 in claimed attorney's fees purportedly pursuant to the
terms of the written Services Agreement. First, such award was
improper as RTNC did not prove a breach of any provision of the
Services Agreement so the pertinent contractual provision did not
even apply.

Second, there was no evidence or finding that the

parties intended the pertinent attorney's fees provision to apply
to a breach of an oral modification to the Services Agreement.
Third, the substantial fee award was improper as there was no
evidence

or

finding

that

RTNC

actually paid,
13

incurred

or was

obligated

to

pay

any

attorney's

fees

in

this

action.

The

attorney's fees provision of the parties' Services Agreement only
provides that a party be "awarded its costs and attorneys fees."
Absent a showing by RTNC of the amount of "its costs and attorneys
fees" (i.e., what it incurred), the award was improper.
Fourth,

RTNC's

failure

documentation or detailed

to

provide

any

contemporaneous

itemization of the work and time in

support of its claim for substantial fees precluded the trial court
from exercising its legally mandated duty to only award fees which
were

reasonably and necessarily

incurred.

Instead, RTNC only

provided a summary created after-the-fact which failed to identify
dates on which services were performed, and simply assigned generic
descriptions to the work performed.

This information is simply

insufficient to determine whether these fees were reasonable and
necessary.
Finally, these same deficiencies made it impossible for the
trial court to determine which fees were properly attributable to
the purportedly compensable claim

(i.e., RTNC's breach of oral

modification claim) versus the non-compensable claims (i.e., all
others).

Thus, each of these foregoing bases require that the

trial court's award of fees to RTNC be reversed.
3.

TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO AWARD COOK ITS FEES AND COSTS

As a final matter, the trial court erred in refusing to award
Cook its fees and costs despite the undisputed fact that Cook was
the only party to prevail on a claim for breach of the parties'
written Services Agreement.

The jury expressly found that RTNC had
14

breached the actual, written provisions of the Services Agreement;
therefore, Cook was entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and
costs as a matter of law and the trial court should be directed to
make such an award.
VI.
1.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST
COOK BASED SOLELY ON AN ORAL MODIFICATION OF THE PARTIES'
WRITTEN AGREEMENT CONTAINING AN EXPRESS PROVISION
REQUIRING ALL MODIFICATIONS TO BE IN WRITING.

A judgment based upon a cause of action that does not exist
cannot be upheld.

In this case, two very sophisticated parties

entered into this agreement.
contract.

Moreover, this was not just any

These parties were contracting with regard to a race for

the United States Congress.

Appellee RTNC, the party who drafted

the Services Agreement, included a clause which was agreed to by
Cook that "no change or modification of this Agreement shall be
valid or binding unless it is in writing and signed by the party
intended to be bound."

Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, H 15. Mr.

Nielson admitted at trial that no attempt had been made to modify
this Agreement in writing as the parties had agreed.

In spite of

his contractual promise, Mr. Nielson sought to have the jury answer
the question whether this written Services Agreement, which in his
own words could not be modified orally, had been orally modified.
In Utah, we respect a party's right to contract.
is not

There simply

(nor should there be) a cause of action for breach of an

oral modification to a contract when sophisticated parties have
agreed the contract cannot be orally modified.
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By submitting the

wrong question to the jury, RTNC obtained a judgment for what is
not a cause of action;
A.

therefore, the Judgment cannot stand.

INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT
FOR THE COURT, NOT A QUESTION
THIS COURT GIVES NO DEFERENCE
THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF

IS A QUESTION OF LAW
OF FACT FOR THE JURY.
TO THE TRIAL COURT ON
THE CONTRACT.

Not only is the ability of sophisticated parties to freely
contract essential to a robust economy, but freedom of parties to
contract is fundamental to our institutions of democracy.

Indeed,

freedom to contract is protected in both our federal Constitution
and the Utah State Constitution.
Utah Const., Article 1 § 18.

See U.S. Const., Article 1 § 10;
Like considerations have led to

doctrines developed by the courts of this state that protect the
parties in their freely contracted-for expectations. For instance,
the courts of this state will not rewrite a contract

between

competent adults even though the contract turns out to disadvantage
one of them, Dalton v. Jerico Const. Co., 642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982),
and

the

courts

of

this

state

do

not

use

loose

interpretive

doctrines such as the implied covenant of good faith to materially
alter the contracting parties1 expectations.

Rio Alaom Corp. v.

Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980).
Interpretation
parties1

contractual

of

the

contract

expectations

and

determination

is a question of

of

the

law to be

determined by the court, not a question of fact to be submitted to
the jury.

E.g., Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d

803, 806 (Utah 1979).

Since contract interpretation is a question

of law, this Court does not give deference to the trial court's
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findings

regarding

the

contract's

interpretation

and

expectations of the parties under the contract they signed.

the
id.

In this case, RTNC drafted the written Services Agreement
entered into by these parties and included therein paragraph 15
which states that the contract can only be modified by a writing
signed by the party intended to be bound.
while

freely acknowledging

At trial Mr. Nielson,

that he did not comply with that

provision, sought and received a jury determination that the
written contract was modified without the required writing he
himself had made a material part of the parties1 expectation.

It

would send the wrong signal to our economy and social institutions
if this

Court were

to hold

that

such

freely contracted-for

protections can be so lightly ignored.
B.

AS A MATTER OF LAW THE WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THESE PARTIES CANNOT BE MODIFIED EXCEPT IN
WRITING SIGNED BY THE PARTY INTENDED TO BE BOUND.

On March 5, 1996 Cook entered into the written Services
Agreement with RTNC for the purpose of fund raising, polling,
advertising, and "general consulting" concerning Mr. Cook's 1996
campaign for election to Congress.
In particular, RTNC agreed that:
In accepting retainment by Client, Nielson shall
undertake and assume the responsibility of performing for
and on behalf of Client all duties and responsibilities
which are reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes of
this Agreement as set forth above.
In particular, Nielson shall oversee all general
consulting for the campaign. This shall include campaign
planning and strategy, convention management, delegate
stacking and targeting, and other duties involved with
general consulting. Nielson shall be required to oversee
and administer all PAC fund raising activities.
In
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addition Nielson shall provide polling, and .advertising
as required and needed by Client.

Client further covenants and agrees that Nielson is
entitled to oversee and conduct all PAC fund raising,
consulting, polling and advertising and that Client will
not conduct any of these activities without first
consulting with Nielson and will not in any way interfere
with Nielson 1 s efforts.
Nielson shall receive 15% of the gross amount of all PAC
monies received, regardless of the source. This agreement to
perform PAC fund raising shall extend for a period of four
months after the general election date.
(b) G€*neral Consulting. Nielson shall receive the sum of
$40,000 for consulting services through May 4, 1996. After
May 4, 1996 and during the periods of the primary and general
elections Nielson shall receive $4,000 a month for general
consulting. . . .
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, UK 2,3 & 4.
Mr. Nielson was well paid for his work.
admission,

Cook

paid

RTNC

By Mr. Nielson's own

approximately

$230,000.00,

[Trial

Transcript, Day 3, pp. 87-88], including $19,521 that the jury
found was improperly billed by Mr. Nielson.

Thus, the written

Services Agreement was very broad in scope covering the entire 1996
election.
While the parties agreed that:
Additional services and fees may be negotiated and agreed
to at a later date.
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P,

11 4. (b),
they also agreed that:
. . . No change or modification of this Agreement shall
be valid or binding unless it is in writing and signed by
the party intended to be bound. Services Agreement U 15.
Thus, while this contract could allow proof of a new contract
between the parties, it cannot be interpreted to allow an oral
18

modification of this contract.

Utah law requires this proper

interpretation.
Under

Utah

law,

the

parties

to

a written

contract

that

contains a clause requiring modifications to be in writing may
modify the terms of their relationship through a new and subsequent
oral agreement.

See, e.g. , Davis v. Payne & D, Inc., 348 P. 2d 337,

33 9 (Utah 1960) .

The courts do not, however, ignore the contract

language and permit an oral contract modification where the parties
themselves have agreed that any contract modification must be in
writing.

To

constitutional

do

so

freedom

diligent to protect.

would
to

violate

contract

that

the

well

our

established

courts have

been

See, e.g., Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott

Co. , 603 P. 2d 803, 806

(Utah 1979) (a court will not rewrite an

unambiguous contract) .
As was pointed out in Davis, supra, a new oral contract can be
proved without violence

to the original contract's prohibition

against oral modifications to that contract.

In Davis the parties

had agreed on specific amounts of materials needed on a jobsite and
the prices to be paid.

They also agreed, as in this case, that

alterations to the contract needed to be made in writing.

As the

job progressed it appeared more materials would be needed and they
were ordered.

The Court held that:

Appellant filled these orders and it is for the value of
these materials for which this suit was brought.
No
claims are made for any materials furnished under the
written contracts.
Davis, 348 P.2d at 339 (emphasis added).
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The Court explained its reasoning in allowing recovery under
the oral agreement even though the written agreement could only be
modified in writing:
The facts are similar to those in Salzmer v. Jos. J.
Snell Estate Corp., wherein this court held that
requirement in a written agreement that no alteration
should be made in the written order of the architect
containing the amount to be paid for such alteration did
not preclude recovery for alterations made on new plans
and specifications not contemplated in the original
agreement, although the alterations were on the same
building which was the subject of the written agreement,
because the parties actually entered into a new agreement
and the defendant was therefore liable for the work and
materials it received from the plaintiff in that action.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, under Utah law a contract provision that modifications
must be in writing will be enforced, even though enforcement of
that provision does not preclude finding of a new oral contract on
the same subject matter.

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-209 (A signed

agreement that excludes modification or recision except by a signed
writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded.)

Under Utah law

the parties are protected in their expectations by the requirement
that the new oral contract meet all the proof requirements of a
valid contract including a meeting of the minds, see Provo City v.
Nielson Scott Co. , 603 P. 2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) , and including the
giving of a valid consideration, Nordfors v. Knight, 60 P.2d 1115
(Utah 1936) . There was no such finding in this case, however, and
the court's Judgment in this respect must be reversed.
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C.

IT WAS UNDISPUTED THAT THE WRITTEN SERVICES
AGREEMENT WAS NOT MODIFIED BY ANY WRITING SIGNED BY
THE PARTY INTENDED TO BE BOUND.

In its Complaint RTNC alleged the written Services Agreement
between the parties and a series of oral contracts concluding that
"all told, Cook has failed and refused to pay Nielson some $193,000
due under the parties1 contracts . . . ."

[R5] (Emphasis added).

Up to and during trial RTNC pursued both its claims for breach
of the written contract, which it claimed was orally modified, and
claims for breach of what it termed independent oral contracts.
[R8]
In the

trial Mr. Nielson

frankly admitted

there were

no

written modifications to the Services Agreement:
Q.

Would you turn back to Exhibit 17 [the Services
Agreement] , please. Turn to the last page of Exhibit 17.
Look at paragraph 15.
Are you familiar with that paragraph?

A.

Yes, I've read through it.

Q.

Okay. Now the essence of that paragraph says that the
only modifications to this agreement that are allowed are
those that are in writing, correct?

A.

That's what it says.

Q.

Signed by the parties?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now, you didn't do that here, did you?

A.

No, we did not.

Trial Transcript, Day 2, p. 165.
After trial RTNC chose to submit to the jury only its claim
for breach of the oral modification of the written contract and
withdrew its claim for breach of the independent oral contracts.
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Thus, there was never a claim and no evidence that the written
Services Agreement had been properly modified by a writing signed
by the party intended to be bound as required by paragraph 15 of
that Agreement.
D.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SUBMIT TO THE
JURY THE LEGAL QUESTION WHETHER THE SERVICES
AGREEMENT WAS MODIFIED.

Notwithstanding the very clear language of paragraph 15 of the
Services Agreement

providing

that the Agreement

could only be

modified in a writing signed by the party intended to be bound, and
the equally clear record that no such writing existed or was ever
executed, the trial court nevertheless asked the jury:
1. Did the RTNC and Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook
for Congress Committee modify their Services Agreement as
alleged by the R. T. Nielson Co.?
[R1941-1942]
Submission of this question to the jury was error.

See, e.g. ,

Gouah v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1973) (where
undisputed facts left only legal question it is error to submit
issue to jury and jury f s erroneous answer to question should be
ignored);

see also Wirtz v. LaFitte, 326 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir.

1964) (same).
E.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE IGNORED THE JURY'S
ERRONEOUS FINDING ON THE LEGAL QUESTION OF WHETHER
THE WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT WAS MODIFIED AND
THIS COURT NEED GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO THAT ERRONEOUS
FINDING.

When the trial court has submitted a legal question to the
jury,

it

is

immaterial

what

the

jury

answered.

Green

Tree

Acceptance, Inc. v. Wheeler, 832 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1987).
The jury's erroneous answer to the legal question submitted to it
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must be ignored.
Cir. 1973) .

Gough v. Rossmoof Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th

It follows that this Court should also ignore the

jury's erroneous finding on this question of law and give this
contract a proper legal interpretation.
Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d

803, 806

See Provo City Corp. v.
(Utah 1979)

(no deference

given to trial court's legal interpretation of contract).
Since legally this contract could only be modified in writing,
signed

by

the party

intended

to be bound,

no

judgment

could

properly be entered on the jury's erroneous finding.
In many cases the distinction between a new oral contract and
an oral

modification

of

an existing

contract

may not make

a

difference, but in this case the distinction has two significant
consequences.

First, the jury did not answer the valid question,

namely whether there were oral agreements between these parties.
Second,

as

more

fully

discussed

below,

the

attorney's

fees

provision of the Services Agreement applies only to "litigation
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement. . .", not to
oral modification of the agreement.
17P, il 14 (emphasis added) .

Services Agreement, Exhibit

Thus, these portions of the Judgment

should be reversed.
F.

THERE ARE NO FINDINGS BY THIS JURY ON THE VALID

OUESTION OF WHETHER THESE PARTIES ENTERED INTO ANY
AGREEMENT' OTHER THAN THE SERVICES AGREEMENT AND THE
JUDGMENT FOR RTNC FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT CANNOT
STAND.
This jury was never asked whether the parties entered into a
new oral contract, which of course would have required proof of all
elements of a contract.

RTNC had pleaded causes of action for new
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oral agreements, but withdrew those claims. Thus, the jury was not
asked the valid factual question whether these parties entered into
any "subsequent agreements to their written Services Agreement" but
instead were asked a question which, as a matter of law, was not a
valid question given the proper legal interpretation of the written
contract-

Because legally this contract could only be modified by

a writing signed by the party intended to be bound and there was no
such writing, the jury's erroneous legal determination in answer to
the question is immaterial to determining the proper outcome of
this

case

and

the

determination is void.

judgment

entered

on

the

basis

of

that

See, e.g., State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276

(Utah 1993) (judgment cannot stand where defendant convicted of
crime that does not exist in Utah) ; U.S. v. Brundage, .136 F.2d 206,
209

(6th Cir. 1943)

(where verdict does not make finding on

material issue, it cannot support judgment).
As a matter of law this contract cannot be interpreted to
allow RTNC to claim an oral modification. Because the jury was not
asked and did not find a new oral agreement between these parties,
the judgment on RTNC's breach of oral modification to the contract
cannot stand.

There simply is not a cause of action in Utah for

breach of an oral modification of a contract that precludes oral
modification.
Since the failure of the jury to make a finding on the
critical question in this case results from RTNC's own calculated
decision to remove that question from the jury's consideration, the
case should not be remanded for new trial but should be reversed
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with judgment entered in favor of Defendant on RTNC's claim, no
cause of action.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC BASED
SOLELY ON BREACH OF THE ORAL MODIFICATION WAS IMPROPER AS
A MATTER OF LAW.

The award to RTNC of attorney's fees was improper as a matter
of law because:
containing

the

(1) Cook did not breach the written agreement
attorney's

fees

provision,

(2)

the

parties1

agreement did not provide for an award of attorney's fees for
breach of an oral obligation, and

(3) attorney's fees are not

recoverable when there is no evidence and there has been no jury
finding that the parties agreed that attorney's fees would be paid
on breach of an oral modification of the agreement.

These are

addressed in turn.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE RTNC DID NOT PROVE A BREACH OF
THE WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT OR ANY COVENANT TO
WHICH THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AGREEMENT ATTACHED.

The other important ramification of the legal conclusion that
this contract cannot be orally modified, even though a new oral
contract is not precluded, regards the award of attorney's fees.
The written contract between these parties specifically provides:
The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce
any provision of this Agreement shall be awarded its
costs and attorneys fees.
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, % 14 (emphasis added).
This language, coupled with the agreement of the parties that this
contract could not be modified except with a writing signed by the
party intended to be bound, clearly evinced the parties' intention
to limit recovery of attorney's fees to litigation regarding the
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terms of the written agreement, not litigation over what someone
might claim as an oral modification.
erred

in awarding

RTNC's

attorney's

As such, the trial court
fees based

solely

on

its

purported claim for breach of an oral modification.
The public policy of the State also dictates this outcome.

It

is well established that Utah follows the "American Rule" when it
comes to the award of attorney's fees.

E.g., Stubbs v. Hemmert,

567 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1977) . Under the American Rule, attorney's fees
can be awarded only if there is an express statutory or contractual
basis for the award.
1976).

E.g. , Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P. 2d 1273 (Utah

In this case there is no statutory basis for recovery of

fees.
Moreover, when there is a contractual liability for fees, the
contractual liability for payment of attorney's fees extends only
to the amount necessary for the enforcement of the contractual
provision breached.

Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 604

(Utah

1978) .
Sound public policy prevents expansion of attorney's

fees

recovery beyond that which is expressly contracted for in writing.
The

public

policy

reason

for

the

American

Rule

is

restricting access to the courts to resolve disputes.

to

avoid

Because of

the uncertainty of litigation, persons with legitimate disputes
would be discouraged from seeking judicial resolution if they run
the risk of paying not only their own, but also their opponent's
fees in the event they lose:
The courts of this state are always open to all for the
redress of grievances and the protection of legal rights,
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and in our judgment they should refrain from allowing the
imposition of costs and expenses upon the losing party
except such as are provided for by statute and such as by
the consensus of the opinions of the courts by long and
uniform usage have been allowed in certain cases as
necessary for the protection of legal rights.
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P. 305 (Utah 1921).
In keeping with that general theme, not only must there be a
statute or contractual provision allowing for imposition of fees,
but even

then fees are allowed only for the specific purpose

authorized, and then only in amounts proven to be reasonable and
necessary.

E.g. , Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P. 2d 1273, 1274 (Utah

1976).
For example, in Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977),
the plaintiff sued to foreclose a promissory note secured by a
mortgage.

The note contained a provision for recovery of fees and

the plaintiff tried to recover fees for both the foreclosure and
for defense of the counterclaim.
foreclosure

but

not

for

The court allowed fees for the

negotiation

and

defense

of

the

counterclaim.
Likewise, in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P. 305,
307-312 (Utah 1921), the statute allowed for recovery of fees for
an action to remove a wrongful attachment.

In that case the court

limited the award "to fees for services in connection with the
attachment itself, and no allowance can be made for services in
defending the principal action, in the absence of a stipulation
therefore in the bond sued on. . . . "
312.
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St. Joseph, 195 P. at 307-

In this case the contractual* provision on which the trial
court relied expressly and exclusively covered "this contract", not
"an

oral

modification

expressly precluded.

of

this

contract"

which

the

contract

Therefore, sound public policy and harmony

with prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court requires this Court
to "refrain from allowing the imposition of attorney fees."

Id.5

As such, the award of fees to RTNC must be reversed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE UTAH LAW DOES NOT ALLOW
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR BREACH OF AN ORAL OBLIGATION.

Utah statutory law requires that the contractual provision
that permits a court to impose attorney's fees on the losing party
must be in writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2000) . Utah Code

section 78-27-56.5 specifically limits the recovery of fees to
those instances where the contractual provision is in a "promissory
note, written contract, or other writing. . . . "

Id.

In a caise strikingly similar to the present action, Petersen
v. Hodges, 239 P.2d 180 (Utah 1951), this Court ruled that a party
is only entitled to attorney's
provision

of

a

written

fees under an attorney's fee's

contract

when

the

claimed

breach

necessitating or giving rise to the attorney's fees is based upon
the terms of the written agreement, not on an oral adjunct to the
written agreement.

Icl. at 183.

5

Where, as here, the parties were entering into a written
agreement with the understanding that it could not be modified
except in writing, they certainly did not contemplate that one
could recover attorney's fees for asserting such an illegal
modification!
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In this case t-here was no finding that Cook breached the
written agreement or any of its terms.

To the contrary, the jury

found it was RTNC who breached the written contract.

As Petersen

instructs and other Utah cases caution, the contractual right to
recover attorney's fees cannot be stretched to cover breach of an
oral modification the contract itself precludes.

Thus, the trial

court erred as a matter of law in awarding attorney's fees to RTNC
and that portion of the Judgment should be reversed.
C.

Even

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT THE
PARTIES AGREED THAT ATTORNEY'S FEES WOULD BE PAID
ON BREACH OF THE ORAL MODIFICATION.

if Utah

allowed

recovery

of

fees based

on an oral

agreement, RTNC did not prove that this oral agreement carried with
it the agreement that damages for breach would include recovery of
attorney's fees.
There was absolutely no evidence (nor any finding by the jury)
that the parties agreed, when entering into any oral agreements,
that the attorney's fees provision of the written contract would
apply to these new contracts.

Having failed in this proof, RTNC

cannot recover attorney's fees.
The case of Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d
instructive on this point.

898

(Utah 1963) is

In Kidman, the defendant had assumed

"in full" plaintiff's obligation under a contract.

Id. at 899.

The contract assumed contained an attorney's fees clause and the
trial court had entered summary judgment against defendant imposing
attorney's fees.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court

and held that plaintiff had the burden of proving that defendant in
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fact assumed the obligation to pay attorney's fees.

Id. at 899.

The case was remanded to the trial court for a trial on the issue
of whether plaintiff could meet its burden to show that in the
later agreement defendant had assumed the liability for attorney's
fees of the prior agreement.

Ld. at 898-899.

In this case the jury has spoken. It did not find a breach by
Cook of the written Services Agreement containing the attorney's
fees clause. There was no finding by the jury and indeed there was
no

evidence

that

when

the

parties

entered

into

the

oral

modification they agreed that attorney's fees were recoverable in
an action for breach of that oral modification.
Nor would the evidence have supported such a finding.

The

contractual provision states in its entirety:
The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce
any provision of this Agreement shall be awarded its
costs and attorney fees."
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, ^ 14.
Significantly, the terms used in this provision do not apply to
"the provisions of this agreement
hereof."

and any oral modification

In fact, the parties contemplated that any extension of

the provisions of this contract would require a writing signed by
both parties

(which did not occur).

Exhibit 17P at % 15.

See Services Agreement,

While such a clause does not prevent the

parties from altering their relationships through subsequent oral
agreement,

it

prevents

extension

of

the

written

contact's

provisions to oral covenants, at least in the absence of a specific
writing, proof or finding that such was the meeting of the minds.
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Thus, there is no factual basis upon which an award of attorney's
fees can be made in favor of RTNC.
proof cannot recover attorney's fees.

RTNC having failed in this
Kidman, 378 P. 2d at 899-

900.
3.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING NEARLY $200,000 IN
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC.

Even assuming an award of attorney's fees was allowed for
breach of an oral modification, there are numerous

independent

grounds upon which the trial court erred in awarding fees to RTNC.
The award of $195,800.93 for attorney1s fees was based solely on
the two (2) affidavits submitted to the trial court.
8c 2381-2408]

[R2071-2077

No evidentiary hearing or oral argument was held

even though the award of fees to RTNC exceeded its recovery on its
claims tried to a jury for ten (10) days.6

With respect to the

affidavits which were submitted, the first affidavit from RTNC's
counsel merely attached a one-page list of the total hours and fees
claimed to have been spent on this matter.

[R2076]

Cook properly

objected as RTNC had failed to show the amount, if any, of the fees
actually incurred by RTNC, and whether those fees were reasonable
and necessary.
More specifically, Cook raised the issue of whether the amount
of fees RTNC was obligated to pay to its counsel was limited by a
contingency fee arrangement.

The trial court then allowed RTNC to

file supplemental materials to support its claim.

In response,

RTNC filed its Supplemental Affidavit which completely ignored the
6

Cook requested oral argument on the attorney's fees
issue, but the request was denied by the trial court. [R2232-2242]
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issue by failing to indicate anywhere that RTNC was liable for
(i.e., incurred) any portion of the $233,326.00 in fees RTNC's
counsel was claiming.

Moreover, RTNC still failed to provide to

the court (or opposing counsel) a single, contemporaneous document
or billing statement itemizing the date and work performed for the
Instead, RTNC ! s counsel spent in

items it sought to recover.

excess of $11,000.00 (which amount was charged to Cook) creating
another after-the-fact summary of the work purportedly performed
which failed to indicate the dates the services were performed and
time spent on those dates, or any detailed or contemporaneous
description of the work performed.

RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit,

which was its second attempt to support its claim for attorneyfs
fees, was thus fatally deficient under Utah law because:
contained

no evidence

that

the attorney's

fees,

if

(1)

It

any, were

actually incurred by or an obligation of RTNC (i.e. , that RTNC paid
or is liable to pay any of the fees);

(2)

It failed to provide

any contemporaneous documentation or other information from which
Cook or the court could determine whether the fees claimed were
reasonable

and

contemporaneous

necessary;
documentation

(3)
or

It

failed

evidence

to

to

provide

allow

a

any

proper

allocation of the claimed fees between compensable versus noncompensable

claims; and

(4)

It failed

to provide

sufficient

evidence to determine if the attorneys' billing rates

(and the

rates charged for non-attorneys) were consistent with the rates
customarily charged in the locality for similar services.
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Thus,

RTNC's request for fees was legally insufficient on each of these
independent grounds and no fees should have been awarded.
A,

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC
WAS IMPROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THERE WAS
NO EVIDENCE NOR ANY FINDING THAT RTNC INCURRED ANY
FEES.7

The provision of the Services Agreement which provides for an
award of attorney's fees states as follows:
14. Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement shall be
awarded its costs and attorneys fees.
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, % 14 (emphasis added).
The basic purpose of, and public policy behind,

this type of

provision is as a cost-shifting mechanism whereby the non-breaching
party

is made whole by having

reimbursed

by

the

breaching

"its costs and attorneys fees"

party.

As

this

Court

recently

explained, there is a "public policy that the basic purpose of
attorney's fees is to indemnify the prevailing party and not to
punish the losing party by allowing the winner a windfall profit."
Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1106-1108
(Utah 2000)(award of fees limited to amount actually paid or for
which party is obligated) (citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996) (no award of fees where
party seeking fees did not actually pay or become liable for legal
representation and thus did not incur attorney's fees));
7

Smith v.

This issue of whether it was proper to award attorney's
fees claimed by RTNC without evidence or a finding they were
incurred, owed, or the responsibility of RTNC is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. E.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson
& Assoc1 s, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (UtahApp. 1996) (citing Robertson v.
Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (UtahApp. 1992)).
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Batchelor, 823 P.2d 467, 473 (Utah 1992)-(same) . Thus, an award of
fees is allowed only where the party claiming fees actually pays or
becomes obligated to pay.
RTNC failed to provide any evidence that it paid any of the
nearly $200,000 in fees it was awarded, or that it was obligated in
any way for the payment of those fees.
make such a finding.

Nor did the trial court

Accordingly, the award of fees must be

reversed.
RTNC f s

failure to provide any evidence it incurred or is

obligated for payment of any portion of the nearly $200,000.00 in
fees is even more curious because Cook specifically raised the
issue in response to RTNC's first application for fees which the
Court

found

deficient,8

and

in response

to RTNC's

second

fee

application as well.

RTNC's repeated failure to respond to this

issue speaks volumes.

It is very possible in this case that RTNC's

representation against Cook was done as a political favor or paid
for by some third-party with political interests divergent from
Cook.

In any event, if RTNC were responsible for these fees, RTNC

could easily have provided evidence to that effect to the court.
Moreover, the fact that there was not a single, contemporaneous

8

In that pleading, Cook indicated that they believed there
was a contingent fee arrangement between RTNC and its counsel. As
such, the recovery of the fee would be limited to the amount of the
contingency set forth in that agreement. See Softsolutions, Inc. ,
1 P.3d
at 1106-1108; Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375; Batchelor,
823 P.2d at 473. RTNC has chosen not to provide this Court with
any evidence the nearly $200,000 in fees are obligations of RTNC
(i.e., "its attorneys fees and costs") as required under the
Services Agreement, and the lack of that evidence is fatal to its
claim for fees.
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billing

statement or record

further evinces that RTNC was not

billed for and, therefore, did not incur the fees sought. RTNC has
completely failed to meet its burden of establishing that any of
the fees claimed were actually incurred or are an obligation of
RTNC.

The award of fees to RTNC, therefore, should be reversed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF NEARLY $200,000 IN
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RTNC WAS IMPROPER AS RTNC FAILED
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE FEES WERE REASONABLE AND
NECESSARY, OR THAT THEY PERTAINED TO A COMPENSABLE
CLAIM.

Even assuming that RTNC was allowed to recover its fees under
the

Services

Agreement

and

there

was

evidence

that

RTNC

had

incurred or become liable for those fees, RTNC has failed to meet
its burden of

establishing

that the

$195,800.93

in fees were

reasonable and necessary, or that the fees pertained to compensable
claims.
Under Utah law, the party claiming entitlement to attorney's
fees has the burden of establishing that the fees claimed were both
reasonably and necessarily incurred.

E.g., Brown v. Richards, 840

P.2d 143, 155 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978
P.2d 470

(Utah App. 1999).

Absent an itemization of the work

performed and the time spent, the trial court could not exercise
its

legally

mandated

duty

to

"disallow

claims

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary charges."
476;

see also Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d

for excessive,

Brown, 978 P.2d at
601, 603-604

(Utah

1978)(no fee recovery where party "failed in his burden of proof
with

regard

purpose");

to the amount

of time necessarily

spent

for that

Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368,
35

380-381 (Utah 1996) (must prove that each of the fees and costs they
assert were incurred were both reasonable and necessary).
1)

RTNC's Failure To Properly Support Its Claims For
Fees Prevented The Trial Court From Finding That
The Fees Claimed Were Reasonable And Necessary.

With respect to the reasonableness and necessity of the
claimed fees, the only evidence submitted by RTNC's counsel was two
(2) nearly identical statements to the effect that all of the work
performed

"was reasonable, appropriate, and necessary for the

proper representation of [RTNC] according to the standards and
practices of similarly situated and qualified attorneys in this
area."

[R2073, 2394]

Moreover, RTNC's two (2) Applications for

Fees wholly failed to include any contemporaneous documentation
such as billing statements, invoices, time records or the like.
Instead, RTNCfs counsel spent more than $11,000.00 creating an
after-the-fact summary which failed to identify dates on which
services were performed, and assigned generic descriptions to work
performed. This summary made it impossible for the trial court and
opposing counsel, and for this Court on appeal, to determine
whether the fees were reasonable and whether they were necessary
for the purpose for which they were performed.9

For instance,10

9

The mere fact that RTNC sought to and did recover from
Cook the more than $11,000.00 in fees for creating this summary
when it could (and should) have simply attached the billing records
establishes the unreasonableness of RTNC's claim.
10

This section simply examines some of the examples where
the evidence clearly fails to allow a determination of
reasonableness and necessity.
This list certainly is not
exhaustive and, more importantly, could not be exhaustive because
the lack of underlying documentation makes it impossible to do so.
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the

summary

indicates

that

there

were

74.3

hours

spent

to

"Draft/edit pleadings re motions for protective orders and/or to
compel."

[R2400]

Absent the dates of the work performed, however,

it is impossible to tie this into any particular work performed, or
determine what resulted from these 74.3 hours and whether it was
reasonable

and

necessary.

As

another

example,

the

summary

indicates nearly 60 hours spent preparing for and participating in
the Felt mediation. [R2402]

Again, without seeing the particular,

contemporaneous time entries (including date and description) there
simply is no way to determine whether such charges were reasonable
or necessary.
Instead, this Court is being asked, just as the trial court
was asked and agreed, to blindly rely on the generic descriptions
and amounts of time assigned by RTNC's counsel years after the
fact.

That simply is not allowed under Utah law.

Particularly

where RTNC's counsel is asking this Court to affirm an award of
nearly $200,000.00 in attorney's fees, more than was recovered in
this

case.

In

sum,

RTNC

failed

to

properly

support

the

reasonableness and necessity of its requested attorney's fees and
the trial court's award of fees should be reversed.
2)

RTNC's

RTNC's Failure To Properly Support Its Claims For
Fees Prevents This Court From Allocating The Fees
Between Compensable And Non-Compensable Claims.
failure to provide

contemporaneous billing

records

showing the dates, the specific descriptions of the work performed,
and the time spent on a particular task also made it impossible for
the trial court to determine what fees were properly attributable
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to the compensable claim (i.e., RTNC's breach of orally modified
contract

claim) 11 versus

others).

RTNC's insistence that the trial court simply rely on the

the non-compensable

claims

(i.e., all

after-the-fact summary RTNC created in its attempt to persuade the
court

to

sanitized,

award

nearly

generic

$200,000.00

descriptions

in fees

set

forth

is

improper.

by

RTNC

did

The
not

adequately describe the work performed such that it can be assigned
to any particular issue.

To make this determination there simply

is no substitute for the description assigned to each item of work
at

the

time

the work

was performed

when

there

was

no

issue

regarding whether the work pertained to a particular claim.
In contrast to the summary relied on by RTNC, the Utah Court
of Appeals in Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P. 2d 470 (Utah
App. 1999), affirmed an attorney's fee award where copies of all
bills for legal work were attached to the fee application.

Despite

this obvious requirement and Cook's continued objection to RTNC's
failure to provide this basic information, RTNC twice failed to
provide this information to the trial court and its request for
nearly $2 00,000.00 in attorney's fees should have been denied as a
matter of law.
In addition to failing to provide the requisite underlying
information for the necessary determinations to be made, RTNC's
summary itself appears to improperly allocate between compensable

11

Of course, as discussed above, it is Cook's position that
none of the claims RTNC prevailed upon were compensable because the
jury did not find that Cook breached the written Services
Agreement.
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and non-compensable

in several respects.12

claims

First, RTNC

apparently included in claims it perceived as "compensable" Cook's
breach of contract claim because RTNC "defeated most aspects" of
that

claim.

RTNC

compensable the

then

pronounced

that

it

only

found

non-

"fees incurred in its defense of the two Cook

counterclaims where RTNC was unsuccessful."

[R2390]

But there

were nine (9) claims in this case altogether and RTNC prevailed on
only one (1) for which the trial court determined attorney's fees
to be properly recoverable.

Thus, RTNC has failed to properly

segregate the fees between compensable and non-compensable claims.
Second,

RTNC's

allocation

of

non-compensable

particular categories do not make sense.

fees

by

For instance, while RTNC

has allocated as non-compensable 76.8% of the mere $1,500 for the
"Pleadings" aspect of the case, RTNC allocated as non-compensable
zero
11

percent

of

the

Settlement/Mediations" ,

more
"Misc.

than

$35,000

Communications" ,

for

the

"Dispositive

Motions", and "Pretrial Procedure" aspects of the case. In fact,
other

than

with

respect

to

"pleadings",

the

ratios

of

non-

compensable fees to compensable fees range between zero to 28.8%,
with the amount allocated to non-compensable claims for five (5)
different areas being less than 2% of the fees.

12

These ratios are

Again, this section simply examines some of the examples
where RTNC clearly failed to properly allocate its requested fees
between compensable and non-compensable fees. This list certainly
is not exhaustive and, more importantly, could not be exhaustive
because the lack of the underlying documentation makes it
impossible to do so.
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simply arbitrary and include fees which clearly should be noncompensable.
3)

The Trial Court's Award Of Attorney's Fees Was
Improper As RTNC Has Failed To Provide Evidence
That The Attorney's (And Non-Attorney's) Billing
Rates Were Consistent With The Rates Customarily
Charged In The Locality For Similar Services,

Finally, RTNC fails to set forth any basis for the hourly
rates set forth in its summary.
the

rates

consistent

which

range

from

There simply is no showing that

$65.00

with rates customarily

similar services.
credentials,

to

$175.00

charged

per

hour

are

in the locality for

In fact, there is no discussion of any of the

experience

or

other

relevant

individuals for which the amounts are charged.

factors

for

the

Other than the

names of these individuals,13 there is no information from which
the court could determine whether the hourly rates are consistent
and proper as required under Utah law.

This is simply another

defect with the proof that was provided to support the claim of
nearly $200,000.00 in attorney's fees.

The award of fees should be

reversed based solely on this lack of fundamental proof by RTNC.

13

Moreover, with respect to someone with the initials "PKN"
there isn't even a name provided even though that person charges
$175.00 per hour.
Interestingly, there was no one with those
initials identified on RTNC's first submission to the court wherein
it was requesting $210,290.00 in fees. This type of inconsistency
and lack of fundamental information further highlights RTNC's
failure to meet its burden of proof, particularly given that it is
seeking an amount of fees which exceeds its entire recovery in this
case.
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4.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING COOK HIS ATTORNEY'.q
FEES AND COSTS RESULTING FROM RTNC' S BREACH OF THE
WRITTEN SERVICES AGREEMENT.14

The written Services Agreement at paragraph 14 contained the
following provision regarding attorney's fees:
Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation
brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement shall
be awarded its costs and attorneys fees.
Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, K 14.
In contrast to RTNC's breach of contract claim based on an oral
modification to the Services Agreement, Cook's contract claim was
for breach of the provisions of the Services Agreement.

The jury's

Special Verdict on Cook's breach of contract claim was as follows:
16. Did [RTNC] breach the Services Agreement as alleged
by [Cook] , including the breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing?
Answer:

Yes.

[R1946]
Given that the jury found that Cook was the only party to prevail
on a claim for breach of the written Services Agreement, it was
error for the trial court not to give effect to paragraph 14 of the
parties' Services Agreement and award Cook its fees incurred in
enforcing the Agreement.

Thus, the trial court's refusal to award

Cook its attorney's fees should be reversed and the case remanded
for a proper determination of the amount of fees to which Cook is
entitled.
14

This issue of whether the court erred in failing to award
attorney's fees to Cook is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. E.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc's, 910 P.2d
1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828
P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992)).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Cook seeks the following
relief:
1)

The trial court's Judgment awarding RTNC $162,962 plus
interest on its claim for breach of the orally modified
contract should be vacated with Judgment entered for Cook
on RTNC's claim, no cause of action;

2)

The trial court's Judgment awarding RTNC $195,800.93 in
attorney's fees should be vacated; and

3)

The trial court's refusal to award Cook his attorney's
fees

incurred

in

connection

with

his

successful

prosecution of his breach of contract claim and defense
of RTNC's claim for breach of contract should be reversed
and

the

case

remanded

to

the

trial

court

for

a

determination of the proper amount to be awarded to Cook.
DATED this Z O - —

day of February, 2001.
ATKIN Sc LILJA, P.C.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE
ATTORNEYS FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.
MERRILL COOK, et al.,

Civil No. 970904869CV

Defendants.

Hon. Sandra N. Peuler

The Court, having reviewed and considered plaintiff's Supplemental Affidavit of
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Objection to RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys
Fees and Costs, and plaintiff's Reply to that Objection, makes the followingfindingsof fact and
reaches the following conclusions of law in support of its award of attorneys fees to plaintiff:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This dispute arose out of services rendered and expenses incurred by plaintiff

R.T. Nielson Co. ("RTNC") for or on behalf defendants Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for
Congress Committee (collectively "Cook") during and following Cook's 1996 congressional
campaign.
2.

In March 1996, RTNC and Cook entered into a written Services Agreement

whereby, inter alia, RTNC agreed to provide services for Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and
Cook agreed to pay for those services. The Services Agreement contains the contractual provision
giving rise to RTNC's claim for attorneys fees.
3.

RTNC claimed that the parties twice orally modified the Services Agreement

to expand and extend RTNC's services and that Cook failed to pay RTNC as agreed under the
modified Services Agreement. Cook denied these claims.
4.

RTNCfirstbrought suit against Cook in January 1997. Shortly thereafter,

that suit was voluntarily dismissed by RTNC without prejudice and the parties engaged in direct
negotiations and in a mediation in an effort to resolve their dispute. These efforts failed.
5.

RTNC refiled suit against Cook in July 1997, and Cook counterclaimed.

RTNC's claims, which were plead in the alternative, included breach of contract, account stated,
and quantum meruit. Cook's counterclaims, some of which were plead in the alternative, included
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach offiduciaryduty against RTNC, and breach of
fiduciary duty against RTNC's principal agent, Ronald T. Nielson.
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6.

Out of all of RTNC's and Cook's claims, only those alleging breach of the

Services Agreement, if and as modified, were ostensibly compensable with regard to attorneys fees.
7.

The parties' respective claims were based upon the same facts. Specifically,

they were based upon the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during and following
Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and Cook's payment or failure to pay for those services and
expenses. Similarly, the legal theories underlying the parties' claims were interrelated and most
claims were plead in the alternative.
8.

The relevant time period for the parties' dispute was early 1996 through

December 1996. For purposes of this discussion, this time period is comprised of two distinct
components. Thefirsttime period ("the election phase"), ranfromearly 1996 through November
5, 1996, the date of thel996 General Election and the date upon which the Services Agreement
expired of its own accord. The second time period ("the post-election phase") ranfromNovember
6 through December, 1996.
9.

The bulk of RTNC's claims and of Cook's counterclaims arose out of the

election phase. This phase encompassed at least 80% of the total relevant time period. Further,
approximately $182,000 of RTNC's total claim of $194,000 (i.e., 94%) was for services rendered
and expenses incurred during the election phase. A similar proportionality applies to Cook's
counterclaims.
10.

There was, effectively, complete factual overlap as to the various claims

each party asserted against the other. Specifically:
-3-

a.

RTNC's alternative claims for election phase services and expenses {i.e., its

compensable breach of contract claim and its noncompensable unjust enrichment
and account stated claims) were based upon the same facts {e.g., conversations,
services, expenses, invoices, payments, nonpayments, notes, and other evidence
from the election phase).
b.

Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his noncompensable

claims regarding the election phase were based on these same facts.
In short, the prosecution and defense of RTNC's and Cook's compensable and noncompensable
election phase claims required proof of what transpired during the election phase. Similarly,
RTNC's and Cook's claims related to the post-election phase (none of which were compensable)
required proof of the same facts, albeit a different set of facts than the election phase claims.
11.

As more specifically itemized in RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of

Attorneys Fees and Costs, this litigation included, inter alia, the following activities:
a.

Extensive written discovery undertaken by both RTNC and Cook;

b.

Multiple depositions, including several that lasted two or more days;

c.

Multiple discovery-related motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority

of these motions);
d.

Multiple dispositive motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority of these

motions);
e.

Multiple pretrial motions;
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f.

Jury selection which, due to media interest, entailed a greater effort by the

parties (e.g., a jury questionnaire, in-chambers voir dire, larger jury pool);
g.

Ten (10) days of trial; and,

h.

Extensive post-trial proceedings, primarily with regard to attorneys fees.

12.

The vast majority of RTNC's litigation effort through trial was spent

developing and presenting RTNC's claims for services rendered and expenses incurred during the
election phase {i.e., its compensable breach of contract claim and its overlapping but
noncompensable alternative unjust enrichment and other claims).
13.

RTNC spent a modest amount of time developing its unjust enrichment

claim for post-election services and expenses. This claim was based on a simple legal principle and
limited facts (i.e., a single invoice and limited testimonyfroma handful of witnesses).
14.

RTNC spent a modest amount of time prior to trial addressing Cook's

claims. Several of these claims were dismissed on summary judgment before trial. These
dismissals encompassed several elements of Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his
alternative unjust enrichment,fiduciaryduty, and other noncompensable claims.
15.

Significant portions of both parties' litigation efforts were not claim-specific

(e.g., discovery and evidentiary motions, credibility, procedural matters and motions).
16.

The case was tried to a jury in April 2000. The only claims tried to the jury

were: (i) RTNC's claim that Cook breached the modified Services Agreement; (ii) RTNC's
overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses; (iii)
-5-

RTNC's unjust enrichment claim for post-election services and expenses; (iv) the remaining
elements of Cook's claim that RTNC breached the Services Agreement; and, (v) Cook's unjust
enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty claims against RTNC and Ronald Nielson.
17.

The juryfound,inter alia, that: (i) RTNC and Cook had orally modified the

Services Agreement as alleged by RTNC; (ii) Cook had breached the parties' modified contract by
failing to pay RTNC as agreed; (iii) RTNC had overcharged Cook for certain expenses; (iv) RTNC
was not entitled to a commission on funds contributed to Cook by political party committees; (iv)
Cook had been unjustly enriched by the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during
the post-election phase; and, (v) all of Cook's other counterclaims were without merit. Further,
RTNC's overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses
was eliminated as a matter of law by the jury'sfindingthat the Services Agreement had been
modified by the parties to include said services and expenses.
18.

With the jury's verdict, RTNC prevailed on its compensable breach of

contract claim and had successfully defended seven of the nine elements of Cook's compensable
breach of contract claims. These seven elements encompassed the vast majority of damages or setoffs sought by Cook. Further, having sought approximately $194,000 in total damages, RTNC
received a net verdict in its favor of approximately $175,000, including some $163,000 for Cook's
breach of the modified Services Agreement.
19.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court previously ruled that RTNC was the

prevailing party under applicable law and that RTNC was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys
fees from Cook for its successful prosecution or defense of compensable claims.
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20.

In its August 8, 2000, Minute Entry, this Court rejected RTNCs initial fee

application and invited RTNC to supplement that application by: (i) itemizing the specific work
performed and time spent in each aspect of the work by each individual employed by RTNCs
counsel; and (ii) segregating this time and effort between compensable and noncompensable
claims.
21.

RTNCs Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, including

specifically Exhibit 1 thereto, accomplished these objectives. Specifically, it:
a.

sets forth the legal basis for an award of attorneys fees;

b.

itemizes, identifies and describes the specific work actually performed by

each member of RTNC s legal team;
c.

sets forth the number of hours spent by each member of RTNCs legal team

in pursuing this matter;
d.

affirms that the hourly rates upon which RTNCs fee application is based

and the total fee award sought are reasonable and customary for comparable legal
services in this area;
e.

articulates a reasonable and rational basis for segregating and allocating

RTNCs attorneys fees between compensable and noncompensable claims; and,
f.

reasonably segregates and allocates RTNCs attorneys fees between

compensable and noncompensable claims.
22.

Cook offers no evidence refuting RTNCs Supplemental Affidavit of

Attorneys Fees and Costs, including but not limited to RTNCs evidence of: (i) the nature,
-7-

reasonableness, and necessity of the work actually performed; (ii) the time expended by any
member of RTNC s legal team on compensable and noncompensable claims; (iii) the factual
overlap between compensable and noncompensable claims; (iv) the reasonableness of the fees
sought; and (v) the consistency of the rates with those customarily charged for similar legal
services in this area.
23.

Based upon RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs

and the Court's personal familiarity with this complicated, high-profile, and hotly-contested
litigation, the legal work performed by RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute this matter. In this vein, it is noted that the time spent by RTNC's counsel through trial
and the fees sought by RTNC are, as evidenced by Cook's own fee application, comparable to the
hours and fees of Cook's counsel through trial.
24.

RTNC's reasonable attorneys fees through September 5, 2000, the date of

RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, were $233,326.00.
25.

Of this amount, $195,800.93 represents reasonable attorneys fees through

said date for the successful prosecution of compensable claims in this matter, the successful
defense of compensable counterclaims in this matter, and the successful prosecution or defense of
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which overlapped factually with said
compensable claims and counterclaims.
26.

The remaining $37,525.07 represents reasonable attorneys fees for the

unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, and the successful prosecution or defense of
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noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which did not overlap factually with any of
the compensable claims or counterclaims upon which RTNC prevailed.
27.

RTNC's cost for the court-ordered mediation was $525.00.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs complies with

the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, with this Court's August 8,
2000, Minute Entry, and with applicable case law. It is otherwise sufficient to meet RTNC's
burden of proof in supporting its requested award.
2.

The $525.00 incurred by RTNC for the court-ordered mediation is a

recoverable cost under Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be taxed as a cost as
against both defendants, jointly and severally.
3.

The compensable claims and counterclaims in this litigation were the

parties' respective claims that the other had breached the modified written Services Agreement.
4.

As the prevailing party, RTNC is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys

a.

successfully prosecuting or defending these compensable claims or

fees for:

counterclaims;
b.

successfully prosecuting or defending noncompensable claims or

counterclaims which overlapped factually with the aforesaid compensable claims
and counterclaims; and,
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c

general litigation efforts not directly related to specific claim or

counterclaim
5.

RTNC is not entitled to recover attorneys fees associated with its

unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, nor for its successful prosecution or defense
of noncompensable claims or counterclaims which did not overlap factually with compensable
claims or counterclaims upon which it prevailed.
6.

Reasonable attorneys through September 5, 2000, for successfully

prosecuting or defending the compensable claims or counterclaims and overlapping
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter were $195,800.93.
7.

RTNC is entitled to judgment for attorneys fees in said amount against both

defendants, jointly and severally, and for the damages heretofore awarded by the jury, for Rule
54(d) costs awarded by the Court, and for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by
law
DATED this

H

day of December, 2000.

Approved as to Form-

Blake S Atkin
JonathonL Hawkins
Attorneys for Defendants
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Attorneys for R. T. Nielson Company
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 970904869CV

vs.
MERRILL COOK, et al.,

Hon. Sandra N. Peuler

Defendants.

This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, the Hon. Sandra N.
Peuler presiding, and the jury having duly rendered its verdict, and the Court having ruled that
plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs, it is ordered and adjudged that Plaintiff
R.T. Nielson Co. recover:
1.

From defendants Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee, jointly and
severally:

970904869 coST^mLL

a.

the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY-TWO AND NO HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($162,962.00), together
with accrued prejudgment interest on said sum through November 30, 2000, in the
amount of SLXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SDC HUNDRED NINETEEN AND
NINETY-SDC HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($67,619.96), and prejudgment
interest accruingfromand after said date through the date this Judgment is signed
and entered at the rate of $44.65 per day (10% apr);

b.

attorneys fees through September 5, 2000, in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NINETY-THREE
HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($195,800.93); and

c.

Rule 54(b) costs in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
NINETY-NTNE AND 85/100 DOLLARS ($4,899.85).

2.

From defendant Merrill Cook, the principal sum of ELEVEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED NINE AND NO HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($11,509.00), together
accrued prejudgment interest on said principal sum through November 30, 2000, in the
amount of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY AND SLXTY-SIX
HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($4,350.66), and prejudgment interest accruing from and
after said date through the date this Judgment is signed and entered at the rate of $3.15
per day (10% apr);
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3.

This Judgment shall bear post-judgment interest at the rate of 7.67%.
The last known addresses of the judgment debtors are:
Merrill A. Cook
631 East 16* Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103-3704
DATED this 1^ day of.

Merrill Cook for Congress Committee
345 South Moffat Court
Salt Lake City, UT 848411
,

, 2000.

By the Court:

O^nrsr/^yK^^f^MA^AA^—)

Hon. Sandra N. Peuler
Third Judicial District Court
Approved as to Form:

Blake S. Atkin
Jonathon L. Hawkins
Attorneys for Defendants
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